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Abstract 
Ectogenesis, or “artificial womb technology,” has been heralded by some, such as 
prominent feminist Shulamith Firestone, as a way to liberate women. In this chapter, 
we challenge this view by offering an alternative analysis of the technology as relying 
upon and perpetuating a problematic model of pregnancy which, rather than liberating 
women, serves to devalue them. We look to metaphysics as the abstract study of 
reality to elucidate how the entities in a pregnancy are related to one another. We 
consider two models of the metaphysics of pregnancy: (1) the Parthood Model, 
whereby the fetus is a part of what/who gestates it; and (2) and the Fetal Container 
Model, whereby the gestator is a container for the fetus. We suggest that under the 
assumption of the Fetal Container Model, we are more likely to think that any 
container will suffice for gestation, even an artificial one. In contrast, under the 
assumption of the Parthood Model, we are less likely to treat the gestator as 
interchangeable or replaceable, given the parthood relationship between gestator and 
fetus. This chapter argues that ectogenesis is conceptually linked to the Fetal 
Container Model and advocates a more cautious approach in promoting ectogenesis as 
a tool for women’s liberation.  
 






What Is Ectogenesis? 
 
“Ectogenesis” derives from ecto meaning “outer,” and genesis meaning “origin.” A 
Google search defines it as “(chiefly in science fiction) the development of embryos 
in artificial conditions outside the uterus” (Oxford Dictionaries 2019). The term 
ectogenesis was coined in 1923 by a British scientist named J. B. S. Haldane in his 
1923 essay entitled Daedalus, or Science and the Future. The concept was then 
utilized by Aldous Huxley, a friend of Haldane, in his 1932 novel Brave New World. 
Already by the 1980s, developments in science had started to bring such ideas to life. 
Between 1982 and 1983, in Bologna and New York City, the first attempts were made 
to perform fetal implantation outside of the human body (Bulletti et al. 1986). Since 
then, many other related experiments have taken place (see Klass 1996; Bryner et al. 
2014). Most recently, in a Nature report from 2017, Alan Flake (from the Children’s 
Hospital of Philadelphia) revealed the development of technology that gestated fetal 
lambs for 4 weeks inside something that looks akin to a plastic bag with tubes going 
through and coming out of it (Partridge et al. 2017).  
 
It is notable that the term “ectogenesis” is not used in these scientific studies. Rather, 
the technology is often referred to as a “device” or a “system.” We ask, then, what is 
meant by “ectogenesis” and how does our understanding of it relate to the fictional 
concept and to scientific reality? 
 
A preliminary distinction to draw here is between full and partial ectogenesis: full 
ectogenesis sees the whole process of pregnancy occurring outside the uterus; partial 
ectogenesis sees only part of the process of pregnancy occurring outside the uterus. 




familiar practices of partial ectogenesis: in-vitro fertilization (IVF) and the use of 
incubators for preterm babies, for instance. Yet the term “ectogenesis” was not 
intended to capture such technologies and so further work is required to uniquely 
define the process in question. The recent work of Kingma and Finn (2020) aims to 
assist in this endeavor.1
Kingma and Finn importantly distinguish between technology that preserves neonatal 
physiology outside of the uterus once the baby has been born, which they call 
“ectogenesis,” and technology that preserves fetal physiology outside of the uterus 
where the fetus continues to gestate, which they call “ectogestation.” Kingma and 
Finn show that the more common (and far less controversial) technologies such as 
IVF and incubation are ectogenetic, whereas the new technology from the 2017 
Nature report is ectogestative. While the term “artificial wombs” is commonly used to 
describe ectogestative technologies, in reality such technologies more closely 
resemble artificial amniotic sacs and artificial placentas. This is because it is not 
simply the environment of the womb that is being replicated (as “artificial womb” 
would imply) but also the other organs involved in gestation such as the amniotic sac 
and the placenta. 
 
In order to avoid the misleading language of “artificial wombs,” we endorse the 
terminology of Kingma and Finn, and use it to challenge the “liberative” prospects of 
full ectogenesis. We shall set aside the question of ectogestation, referring to it only as 
a helpful contrast. We shall also set aside questions regarding partial ectogenesis, in 
line with the intuition that it is not such partial forms that attract controversy or 
promise women’s liberation. Acknowledging that full ectogenetic technologies do not 




of its partial forms (with IVF at the start and incubation at the end), where the 
processes meet in the middle to replicate a full pregnancy.2 It is this, often idealized, 
full ectogenesis that we will problematize herein due to its relation to a potentially 
harmful cultural concept of pregnancy—the Fetal Container Model (see below). 
 
We will begin our analysis by considering philosophical arguments in favor of full 
ectogenesis more closely, with regard to surveying its potential therapeutic benefits 
and the social benefits articulated by such feminists as Shulamith Firestone. These 
considerations are largely ethical and based on hypothetical reasoning, were full 
ectogenesis to become an available technology. We will then consider criticisms of 
this stance, providing reasons to doubt its efficacy for women’s liberation. Such 
reasons will again derive from philosophical inquiry, by looking to counterexamples 
of the supposed benefits and providing intuition-based ethical evaluations. Next, we 
attempt to re-diagnose the problem of women’s oppression: perhaps it is not 
biological difference that gives rise to such oppressive conditions, but rather the 
devaluation of pregnancy itself that makes reproduction seem an oppressive practice 
to some. We will argue for this on the basis of a conceptual analysis of pregnancy, 
which largely involves analyzing the language used to describe pregnancy and the 
concepts that underpin it. Our methodology requires the use of tools from the 
metaphysics of pregnancy, where we look to metaphysics as the abstract study of 
reality to elucidate the entities involved in a pregnancy and how they are related to 
one another. We advocate for a non-essentialist view of sex, gender, and sexism, by 
instead problematizing full ectogenesis through the use of two particular concepts—
Containment and Parthood. We conclude that a change in the concepts surrounding 





Our argument is two-fold: (1) drawing on metaphysical views of pregnancy and their 
connections to cultural models of pregnancy, we show that one current conception of 
pregnancy—the Fetal Container Model—may be harmful; (2) we show that the 
hypothetical technology understood as full ectogenesis potentially rests upon and 
perpetuates that harmful (and maybe impossible) conceptualization of pregnancy. We 
thus conclude that full ectogenesis should not be relied upon to help deliver women’s 
liberation from the trials and tribulations of pregnancy (which we note would also 
involve “liberating” them from its wonders and joys as well). 
 
The Potential Value of Ectogenesis 
 
There are a multitude of women who want to become pregnant and enjoy giving birth, 
and who gain enormous self-actualization from doing so. Nevertheless, the process is 
not without its complications. We need not reiterate the significant side effects of 
preterm birth,3 nor of the pregnancy and birthing process itself,4 to appreciate the 
potential therapeutic value of full ectogenesis as an alternative or additional option to 
pregnancy. With the ability to transfer and/or develop fetuses using some sort of 
reproductive technology, care of preterm neonates and those vulnerable to risky 
pregnancies could be significantly improved. The tension between preserving the 
health of the pregnant person and protecting the life of the fetus would thus be 
reduced, if not eliminated. Furthermore, those unable or unwilling to undergo 
pregnancy for any number of reasons, yet wish to have children, may also utilize the 
technology, adding significantly to its potential social value. 
 
Again, some feminists have instead located the primary value of full ectogenesis in its 




2020; Cavaliere 2020). Most notably, Shulamith Firestone (1974) argued that the 
source of women’s oppression results from what she described as an uneven 
distribution of reproductive labor. After declaring the processes of pregnancy and 
birth “barbaric” (p. 198), she concluded that full ectogenesis (although she did not call 
it by this name) was a necessary, though not sufficient, part of the solution. This 
particular argument in favor of full ectogenesis notes that an unfair division of 
reproductive labor exists, and that full ectogenesis could remedy the situation by 
eliminating this difference in reproductive ability, thereby removing the condition that 
had purportedly ensured women’s oppression.5  
 
However, we question the technology’s ability to genuinely address the potential 
oppressiveness of reproduction. For instance, full ectogenesis could only ensure a fair 
redistribution of reproductive labor if reproductive work were limitable to the process 
of pregnancy. Yet, post-birth, it seems to (still) be women who are (largely) expected 
to feed the newborn, raise and nurture the child, and so on. But this argument is not 
intended as an exclusionary criterion to dismiss from the debate other people and 
groups who can and do partake in reproductive work. We do not align with naturalist 
arguments that problematize such technologies for deviating from “natural” 
reproductive processes, thereby excluding—whether intentionally or not—such 
marginalized groups as trans people, people who cannot or do not wish to reproduce, 
or those unable to conceive, to name only a few, from this important discussion.   
Yet still, it remains unclear what full ectogenesis would do to address the social 
conditions that we believe give rise to the potential oppressiveness of reproduction in 
the first place. Given these conditions, should fetuses be gestated ectogenetically, it 






This brings us to our primary objection against idealizing full ectogenesis as a 
feminist tool: the technology, rather than alleviating or mitigating the potential 
devaluation of reproductive work, perhaps instead would perpetuate it. It cannot be 
ignored that as a society we tend to outsource work we do not value. For example, 
just as cleaning, once delegated to the housemaid, has now become at least partially 
the responsibility of machines like the Roomba (the robot vacuum cleaner), so too 
might we find that full ectogenesis passes the burden of pregnancy down the ranks: 
from the intended mother, to the surrogate mother, and eventually, to technology. 
Krstić similarly distinguishes opposing feminist responses to ectogenesis based on 
their conceptual differences of pregnancy as such: 
 
The attitude of feminist authors… depends upon their interpretation of 
ectogenesis as an instrument of patriarchal oppression, or as a means of 
empowerment. This interpretation itself depends upon the evaluation of the 
female body and its specificity—the function of biological reproduction—as a 
source of strength or weakness in the context of individual or collective female 
achievement; and upon the evaluation of biological and social motherhood in 
that same context, as a coercion or a potential for agency. (Krstić 2015: 50) 
 
Like Krstić, we aim to show how an evaluation of ectogenesis depends upon an 
evaluation of the metaphysics of pregnancy. We also argue that the problem of 
women’s oppression has potentially been misdiagnosed by feminists like Firestone, 
leading to the false identification of full ectogenesis as an essential part of the 
solution. As the problematics of such accounts make clear, we argue that it is the 




also household tasks like doing children’s laundry etc., that potentially renders the 
process oppressive in the first place. Pregnancy, or, per Firestone, the sexual 
difference between males and females, is to us not necessarily the cause of the 
oppression of women (recognizing that many conditions ultimately underpin this 
oppression). Rather, it is a certain cultural concept of pregnancy currently in 
circulation—but not necessarily held by all—that is doing much of the oppressive 
work. As such, it is conceptual change away from that specific concept that may be 
more promising in aiding the liberation of women from oppression, rather than this 
physical change. Pregnancy should not be devalued, and we problematize full 
ectogenesis because of its potential to devalue pregnancy on the grounds of a certain 
cultural concept that serves to oppress women. 
 
The specific cultural concept of pregnancy to which we refer is known as the Fetal 
Container Model, and, as we will show here, the relative ease with which this model 
lends itself to the devaluation of reproductive work may potentially hinder the 
liberation effort. As we aim to demonstrate, full ectogenesis shares a problematic 
relationship with this model. The solution, then, is not to eradicate the process of 
pregnancy, but rather to change how we think of it. Though Firestone advocates 
eliminating sexism via challenging “its roots in the biological division of the sexes” 
(1974: 12), we might now reconceive of those sex differences in a way that will not 
give rise to sexism. That is to say: we need not eliminate sex difference to eliminate 
sexism. And we need not idealize the prospect of full ectogenesis as a step towards 
eradicating sexism. As we will show in the remainder of this analysis, not only is it 
unnecessary to do so, but its conceptual entanglements with the Fetal Container 





The Metaphysics of Pregnancy 
 
Consider the following metaphysical question about pregnancy: Is the fetus a part of, 
or contained by, the gestator?6   
  
Since certain assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) are meant to emulate the role 
of gestator during pregnancy, the answer to this question will necessarily impact how 
we conceive of ectogenesis itself. Understanding the roles of gestating persons will 
therefore clarify the role their artificial replacement is intended to satisfy. We 
recognize that the metaphysics of pregnancy will not fully capture that role, as it 
considers only the mereological (the relation of part to whole) and topological (the 
connections between entities) relationship between fetus and gestator. This is not 
necessarily a problem for our account, though, for what we intend to show is that even 
in a limited, incomplete account of the role of gestating, full ectogenesis, which 
would obviously rapidly intensify our current process of birthing techno-sapiens, 
likely distorts or fails to fulfill such a role. There is, of course, much more to 
understanding pregnancy than the mereology and topology of the entities involved, as 
women and mothers are not simply their physiologies. This chapter has a narrow 
focus on the metaphysical mereo-topological relationship between gestator and fetus, 
yet we recognize the need for a cognitive, emotional, cultural, and perhaps even 
spiritual account that is sensitive to the biopsychosocial multiplicity and complexity 
of pregnancy to get a fuller picture. 
 
We will now consider two perspectives of the metaphysical relationship between fetus 




underwrite the cultural models of pregnancy named the Parthood Model and the Fetal 
Container Model.  
 
Parthood: The idea that the fetus is a part of the gestator is held by Kingma (2019: 
162), who clarifies this position by stating that “one can start by treating talk of 
[fetuses] being parts of [gestators] as parallel to talk of, say, kidneys being parts of 
dogs.” So, the gestator is the whole, and this gestator may have many parts like limbs 
and organs, where the fetus is one of (albeit a potentially very special one of) those 
parts, linked to and interdependent with its gestator. It is important to note that this 
view does not specify what sort of thing the fetus is; it only states how it is 
mereologically related to the gestator—namely, as a part of a larger whole. This 
metaphysical and holistic understanding of the fetal-gestator relationship provides a 
conceptual basis for the cultural Parthood Model, which we see manifest in our 
society when we use language about the pregnant “bump” (which is seen as a part of 
the gestator’s body), and slogans like “my body, my choice.” All birth activists hold 
this Parthood view, often using the term “MotherBaby” to index the oneness of the 
mother with the child in her womb (see eg. Lalonde et al. 2019). 
 
Containment: In this view, the gestator surrounds and contains the fetus inside of their 
body. Unlike in the Parthood view, the fetus and gestator are mereologically separate 
entities. Smith and Brogaard provide the analogy of the fetus being inside the gestator 
in the same way as “a tub of yogurt is inside your refrigerator” (Smith and Brogaard 
2003: 74). Again, this view does not state what sort of thing the fetus is; it only says 
that the fetus is inside the gestator without also being a part of them. This 




basis for the Fetal Container Model, whereby gestators are depicted as “containing” 
the fetus that they gestate inside their cavity-like wombs.  
 
Kingma argues that the Fetal Container Model is the dominant way in which we 
conceive of pregnancy in Western culture. The frequency with which we hear of 
“buns in the oven” provides some support for this claim, but also telling are the 
efforts to depict: (1) the physical continuity between the fetus and the subsequent 
baby (using imagery of fetuses as practically fully-formed babies rather than what is 
more appropriate for their gestational stage of development); and (2) the physical 
discontinuity between fetus and gestator (using imagery of the fetus as freely floating 
inside a bubble-like womb rather than the complex intertwinement within the 
gestator’s body).  
 
There are many harms that appear to be caused or perpetuated by this model. For 
example: how it may devalue gestation (so long as the gestative work is being done, 
any container will do); and, per Smith and Brogaard’s yogurt-fridge analogy, which 
portrays pregnancy as a case of mere containment (as the contents of a fridge are not 
considered part of it), the dehumanizing effects of being likened to (and treated as) 
something fungible—exchangeable or replaceable, like a container (or appliance!). 
Baron captures the concern in her article on surrogacy:  
 
This Foetal Container model is used in conjunction with social ideals of 
motherhood to pressure expectant mothers to monitor and modify their 
behavior and lifestyles, and to emphasise women’s responsibility for foetal 
outcomes; it is used in conjunction with the language of the market to 




someone else’s child. Different moral frameworks and concepts use the foetal 
container model to justify different outcomes in these contexts: to nurture the 
foetus but not mourn miscarriage, or to nurture the foetus but not mourn 
giving up the child; to claim that the rights of the foetus outweigh the rights of 
the gestating woman, or to claim that the rights of the commissioning parents 
outweigh the rights of the gestating woman. The foetal container model of 
pregnancy does not necessarily entail women’s diminished subjectivity; 
however, in the patriarchal context in which this model has developed, it can 
pave the way for the reduction of pregnant women to mere containers.  (Baron 
2018: 12) 
 
Note that Baron is suggesting that the metaphysical Containment view is morally 
neutral and tarnished only by its harmful usage as the Fetal Container Model in a 
patriarchal context. So, as Baron describes, while the metaphysical Container view 
may itself be morally neutral, its cultural manifestation as the Fetal Container Model 
has evidently developed and been used in a patriarchal context with significant harm. 
In this way, the Fetal Container Model seems to lend itself more to the devaluation of 
gestation by minimizing the role of the gestator than does the Parthood Model, which 
places the gestator at the center of the pregnancy process. This does not prove that the 
Fetal Container Model is necessarily morally dubious, but only contingently and 
instrumentally so. 
 
Some may remain unconvinced by the relationship between the metaphysics and the 
ethics sketched out thus far. In this case, it is worth pointing out that further to its 
moral dubiousness, the Containment view looks to be factually dubious as well. By 




pregnancy as involving two mereologically unrelated entities. But with reference to 
the connections between fetus and gestator, Kingma (2019:628) reminds us of the 
biological realities of pregnancy: the umbilical cord, which connects the fetus to the 
placenta, which itself grows into the uterine wall, connecting the fetus to the gestator; 
the fetus and the gestator sharing one external boundary, challenging the claim that 
the two are somehow separate; and, reinforcing this, the lack of any separating cavity 
between the fetus and the gestator (as would be expected were we dealing with two 
entities that were not a part of the other).  
 
But while we have aimed to problematize a Containment view of pregnancy, we have 
yet to demonstrate why this should lead full ectogenesis to a similar fate. In the next 
section, we will argue that full ectogenesis likely cannot be conceived of without 
depending on a Fetal Container Model, and because of this inextricability, we ought 
to be suspicious of any notions about its potential to help liberate women. 
Furthermore, if the relationship between fetus and gestator involves more than 
containment, then one might think that the technologies that replicate it should do so 





How does full ectogenesis rely on and perpetuate a Fetal Container Model? Most 
obviously, the very term “ectogenesis” seems to at least imply it: ecto-genesis literally 
means originating outside, where the contrast would be originating inside the body. 
This inner-outer dichotomy is reminiscent of the language of birth according to the 




2003:65) from inside to outside the gestator’s container-like body. Smith and 
Brogaard (ibid.) go on to state, “birth is the mere passage of an entity from one 
environment to another (it is analogous to an astronaut leaving her spaceship).” As 
such, being inside or outside the spaceship/womb implies a topological (containment), 
and not a mereological (parthood), relationship between the fetus and gestator.  
  
However, were we to adopt the Parthood view, then the prospect of disrupting the 
part-whole relationship between fetus and gestator (or replicating their 
interconnectedness) using ectogenetic technology seems far less plausible or 
desirable. The technology described earlier in this chapter as ectogestation works 
better in replicating that interconnectedness, whereas ectogenesis works better to 
replicate containment. How pregnancy is perceived plausibly limits what technologies 
are desirable to pursue. Likewise, the very idea that technology could replace some or 
all stages of pregnancy depends on our concept of pregnancy. This point is similarly 
made by Aristarkhova (2005:51): 
 
Mechanization of the maternal body in philosophy and the life sciences has 
both derived from and served the devaluation of its participation in genesis 
and the birth process, as well as the disconnection of the fetus from the uterus. 
Ectogenesis is a workable concept only if one assumes that the embryo and the 
mother are two separate and therefore separable entities.  
 
The presupposition of the Fetal Container Model can also be seen in the following 





Nothing is more awesome than the emergence in these early weeks of a 
recognizable human form from a tiny, undifferentiated mass. Such unique 
events might be expected to need a special environment, but the uterus is just a 
clever incubator. (Gosden 2000:183–184) 
 
If the uterus is “just a clever incubator,” then containment-like technologies such as 
ectogenesis can succeed in fulfilling their designated roles—liberating women from 
pregnancy and birth and aiding in our current transformations into techno-sapiens. 
And if, as has been observed, there is a strong tendency to conceive of (and treat) 
gestators as containers or incubators for fetuses, then viewing ARTs in the same way 
requires no leap of the imagination. Ectogenetic technologies (like incubators) align 
more closely with the Fetal Container Model, deploying its key tenets to sustain its 
plausibility.  
 
Were we to accept that the only necessary part of pregnancy is the uterus, where it 
represents the “clever incubator” and where incubation is ectogenetic technology, full 
ectogenesis may become a desirable technology. Yet the first premise is simply 
untrue—the uterus is not the only necessary part of pregnancy. Nevertheless, it would 
be too quick to conclude that ectogenesis therefore necessarily entails or endorses the 
Fetal Container Model, as ectogenesis might simply be viewed as an alternative to 
pregnancy, an option that likely only the privileged could choose. Yet it still follows 
that any technology employing and perpetuating key tenets of an evidently 
problematic model may unwittingly lead to normalizing and perhaps perpetuating 
these very same problems (e.g., the devaluation of gestative work and a dismissal of 





On the other hand, the very possibility of full ectogenesis may be taken as evidence 
that perhaps there never existed a parthood relationship between a fetus and its 
gestator; that it may be precisely because there is no parthood relationship in general 
between fetus and gestator that ARTs like the partial ectogenesis of IVF and 
incubation “work.” Thus, we could move in the direction of learning about pregnancy 
from the technology that we create to replicate it.  
 
By the same line of reasoning, however, it might be argued that the very reason full 
ectogenesis is not currently a reality is because pregnancy involves more than 
containment. It might be that full ectogenesis remains inconceivable because the 
notion of a mere-containment-like pregnancy is simply inconceivable to us now. 
 
But methodological problems loom. It must be clarified whether the reality of such 
technologies is evidence for the truth of a metaphysical model of pregnancy, or 
whether the relationship between fetus and gestator differs depending on the ART (or 
lack therof) in play. In other words, it remains to be seen whether ARTs distort the 
relationship between fetus and gestator, or rather whether these technologies 
illuminate what the relationship is like, regardless of such technological factors.  
 
If we proceed with the assumption that there is no parthood relationship between the 
fetus and the technology that supports it—for example, there being no parthood 
relationship between fetus and ectogenetic container, then we must select between 
two options: (1) Would full ectogenesis destroy a parthood relationship that is 
otherwise present between fetus and gestator? Or (2) would full ectogenesis show us 
that there was never any parthood relationship between fetus and gestator? In other 




whatever/whomever is gestating? And if it does, then we must ask whether it is a 
welcomed alteration. In this chapter, we hope to have given some preliminary 
analysis regarding why this might not be the case. 
 
Concluding that ectogenesis may share some relationship with a problematic model of 
pregnancy does not amount to calling the technology itself necessarily problematic, 
nor for a moratorium or pre-emptive ban on the research and development of any 
associated technologies. However, when a technology is either founded on or 
potentially perpetuates a certain representation of women, and when that 
representation has been used elsewhere to denigrate and mistreat women, good 
practice dictates that we question the extent to which its ability to alleviate a 
biological constraint is truly serving the feminist cause overall—especially if it is 
unable to address the harmful attitudes that make this constraint oppressive in the first 
place. 
 
Furthermore, it remains unclear whether ethical evaluations of full ectogenesis 
generally carry over to partial ectogenesis (like IVF and incubation) and vice versa. If 
partial ectogenesis is to be acceptable when full ectogenesis is not, then some account 
is necessary to articulate why the reasons for rejecting full ectogenesis do not apply to 
its partial forms. This may be done by determining just how “partial” ectogenesis 
must be for it to be deemed acceptable. Or, for those who wish to hold on to the 
intuition that partial ectogenesis in the forms of IVF and incubation are 
unproblematic, but full ectogenesis is problematic, our approach offers another 





Recognizing that pregnancy involves more than containment (and, of course, more 
than a metaphysical relationship), we might challenge the potential of reproductive 
technologies designed only to contain rather than gestate. Note that there is a 
distinction between containment and mere containment that ought to be respected—
without any parthood relationship between fetus and gestator, we see pregnancy 
described as mere containment, whereas for as long as there is some parthood 
relationship present, we see pregnancy as involving containment without being 
defined by containment. Our criticism of full ectogenesis relates to its reliance on and 
potential perpetuation of a fetal containment view of pregnancy as a whole—a 
reductionism that partial ectogenesis does not fall foul to in virtue of it being partial. 
If there is more to gestation than incubation, then the process requires more than 
ectogenesis to replicate it, and we should shift our conceptions of pregnancy 
accordingly.  
 
Conclusion: A Conceptual Overhaul 
 
We have argued that we ought to doubt the potential of full ectogenesis as a tool for 
women’s liberation for the very reason that the technology might undermine progress 
towards such a result. To arrive at this conclusion, we began by considering the 
arguments in favor of ectogenesis, both from the therapeutic perspective and from a 
social perspective. Recall that feminists such as Firestone argued that the source of 
women’s oppression stemmed from the biological difference in reproductive ability 
between the sexes. Full ectogenesis, as an attempt at neutralizing the process of 
reproduction, was subsequently identified as part of the solution to this problem. We, 
and others, have revealed the limitations in such an approach to the liberation effort, 




the reproductive process, nor that biological difference really is the source of 
women’s oppression.  
 
Addressing this last point, we have attempted to re-diagnose the problem of women’s 
oppression by suggesting that it is in fact the potential cultural devaluation of 
pregnancy that can render reproduction an oppressive process. Here we utilized tools 
and views from the metaphysics of pregnancy. In considering the metaphysical 
relationship between the fetus and gestator, we can see how and why it might be that 
full ectogenesis becomes problematic for feminism. As a technology conceptually 
entangled with the problematic Fetal Container Model of pregnancy, we conclude that 
full ectogenesis remains inherently limited in securing women’s liberation. We further 
argue that pregnancy or sexual difference is not the cause of oppression; rather, it is 
our potential concept of pregnancy that can cause oppression. Perhaps, then, it is a 
conceptual overhaul that we require—specifically, the overhaul of the Fetal 
Containment Model, which is the cultural concept that lends itself to the devaluation 
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1	See also Cannold (1995:56) for an articulation of the partial/full ectogenetic 
distinction.	
2 The current state of science is such that ectogenesis is only available to cover the 
very first and very last part of a pregnancy—or rather, more accurately, ectogenesis 
either pre-dates the pregnancy or follows the pregnancy, but cannot replace all 
pregnant stages. As Kingma and Finn (2020:362) write: “Partial ectogenesis presently 
exists at both ends of the gestational period: (early) embryos can spend time in a petri-
dish in the first few days of development; neonates can spend months in an incubator 
at the other. It may, and frequently is, glibly assumed that it is only a matter of time 
before improvements at both ends “meet in the middle”—so to speak.”  
3 Outcomes for babies born preterm depend on multiple factors including appropriate 
gestational growth at birth, gestational age, conditions surrounding the birth, the 
culture in which the birth takes place, the place of birth, and so on. Despite current 
interventions to aid preterm babies, they exist in what is known as the “gray zone” of 
viability, when survival is sometimes uncertain. See Seri and Evans (2008) for the 
risks of this gray zone.  





5 Of course, this requires more than just the elimination of pregnancy, but a complete 
restructuring of society and women’s place within it. See Firestone (1974:10) for a 
description of this restructuring.  
6 This is the language used and the way the debate is set up by Kingma (2019). We 
follow the terminology of “gestator” or “pregnant person” and “fetus” (as opposed to 
mother and baby) in order to avoid gendered and social connotations and to stay 
neutral on whether the fetus meets certain metaphysical and scientific conditions on 
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